Stamm v. Kijakazi

577 F.Supp.3d 358

Jeromy R. STAMM, Plaintiff,

v.Kilolo KIJAKAZI,¹ Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-02273

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed December 31, 2021

Sharon Gornstein, Leventhal Sutton & Gornstein, Trevose, PA, for Plaintiff.

George Michael Thiel, U.S. Attorney's Office, Scranton, PA, for Defendant Andrew Saul.

MEMORANDUM

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, Chief United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Jeromy R. Stamm ("Stamm") brings this action under section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") denying his application for supplemental security income under Title II of the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1). This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge on consent of the parties, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 10). For the following reasons, and upon detailed consideration of the arguments raised by the parties in their respective briefs, it is hereby ordered that the Commissioner's decision to be AFFIRMED.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 12, 2017, Stamm protectively filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits, claiming disability beginning December 23, 2015, due to spondylolysis, stenosis, lumbar degenerative disc disease, lumbosacral neuritis, arthritis in hands and back, obstructive sleep apnea, asthma, nerve pain, and chronic pain. (Doc. 14-6, at 2; Doc. 14-7, at 6). The Social Security Administration ("SSA") initially denied the application on June 23, 2017, prompting Stamm's request for a hearing, which Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Edward L. Brady held on October 8, 2019. (Doc. 14-2, at 34; Doc. 14-4, at 19). In written decision dated October 30, 2019, the ALJ determined that Stamm is not disabled and therefore not entitled to benefits or income under Title II. (Doc. 14-2, at 17-28). The Appeals Council subsequently denied Stamm's request for review on October 2, 2020. (Doc. 14-2, at 2).

On December 4, 2020, Stamm commenced the instant action. (Doc. 1). The Commissioner responded on May 14, 2021, providing the requisite transcripts from Stamm's disability proceedings. (Doc. 13; Doc. 14). The parties then filed their respective briefs, with Stamm raising three principal bases for reversal or remand. (Doc. 23; Doc. 26). This matter is ripe for disposition.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

To receive benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) ; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509. To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any other substantial gainful activity in significant numbers in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) ; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a).² Additionally, to be eligible to receive Title II benefits, a claimant must be insured for disability insurance benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(a) ; 20 C.F.R. § 404.131.

A. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

In evaluating whether a claimant is disabled, the "Social Security Administration, working through ALJs, decides whether a claimant is disabled by following a now-familiar five-step analysis." Hess v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. , 931 F.3d 198, 200–01 (3d Cir. 2019). The "burden of proof is on the claimant at all steps except step five, where the burden is on the Commissioner of Social Security." Hess , 931 F.3d at 201 ; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a)(1). Thus, if the claimant establishes an inability to do past relevant work at step four, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could perform consistent with his or her residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a)(1).

B. JUDICIAL REVIEW

The Court's review of a determination denying an application for Title II benefits is limited "to considering whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence." Katz v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. , 798 Fed.Appx. 734, 736 (3d Cir. 2019). Substantial evidence "does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Pierce v. Underwood , 487 U.S. 552, 565, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). The quantum of proof is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by such evidence. Mason v. Shalala , 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). In an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be "something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ's decision] from being supported by substantial evidence." Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n , 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966).

The question before the Court, therefore, is not whether Stamm is disabled, but whether the Commissioner's determination that Stamm is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based on a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin , No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) ("[I]t has been held that an ALJ's errors of law denote a lack of substantial evidence."); Burton v. Schweiker , 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) ("The [Commissioner]’s determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts."); see also Wright v. Sullivan , 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal matters is plenary). "In determining if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole." Leslie v. Barnhart , 304 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). If "the ALJ's findings of fact ... are supported by substantial evidence in the record," the Court is bound by those findings. Knepp v. Apfel , 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000).

III. THE ALJ'S DECISION

In his written decision, the ALJ determined that Stamm "was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time from December 23, 2015, the alleged onset date, through September 30, 2018, the date last insured." (Doc. 14-2, at 28). The ALJ reached this conclusion after proceeding through the five-step sequential analysis provided in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

A. STEP ONE

At step one of the five-step analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If a claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity, the claimant is not disabled, regardless of age, education, or work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Substantial gainful activity is defined as work activity requiring significant physical or mental activity and resulting in pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572. The ALJ must consider only the earnings of the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(a)(2). Here, the ALJ determined that "[Stamm] did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from his alleged onset date of December 23, 2015 through his date last insured of September 30, 2018." (Doc. 14-2, at 19).

B. STEP TWO

At step two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment—or a combination of impairments—that is severe and meets the 12-month duration requirement. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the ALJ determines that a claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits the claimant's "physical or mental ability to do basic work activities," the ALJ will find that the claimant does not have a severe impairment and is therefore not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If, however, a claimant establishes a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the ALJ proceeds to step three. Here, the ALJ found that Stamm had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease, post-laminectomy syndrome, arthritis, obstructive sleep apnea, asthma, and obesity. (Doc. 14-2, at 19). The ALJ further reasoned that Stamm’ other diagnosed medical condition, hypertension, was not severe, as it was generally controlled using medication, and there was no evidence of major cardiac events related to high blood pressure in the record. (Doc. 14-2, at 20).

Regarding Stamm’ mental impairments, the ALJ determined Stamm’ history of depression was not severe, as it caused no more than a minimal limitation in Stamm's ability to perform basic mental work activities. (Doc. 14-2, at 20). The ALJ reached this finding by considering the four broad areas of mental functioning set out in the disability regulations for evaluating mental disorders - understanding, remembering, or applying information, interacting with others, concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace, and adapting or managing oneself. (Doc. 14-2, at 20-21). The ALJ also determined Stamm's history of anxiety did not constitute a medically determinable impairment because it was established solely based on Stamm's allegations regarding symptoms and was not derived from an "acceptable medical source." (Doc. 14-2, at 21).

C. STEP THREE

At step three, the ALJ must determine whether the severe impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals the...