State v. Manuel

14 Wash.App.2d 455

471 P.3d 265

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.James H. MANUEL, Appellant.

No. 80405-7

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

FILED August 31, 2020

Vitaliy Kertchen, Kertchen Law, PLLC, Tacoma, WA, for Appellant.

Laura Ann Petregal, King County Prosecutors Office, Prosecuting Atty. King County, King Co. Pros./App. Unit Supervisor, W554 King County Courthouse, Violetta A. Stringer, King County Courthouse, Gavriel Gershon Jacobs, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Andrus, A.C.J. ¶1 James Manuel challenges an order from King County Superior Court restoring his right to possess a firearm under RCW 9.41.040(4) as to his conviction from that court and refusing to do so as to convictions from Pierce County Superior Court and Lakewood Municipal Court.

¶2 We hold RCW 9.41.040(4)(b) is not a jurisdictional limit on a superior court's authority to restore a defendant's firearm rights. The statute gives a petitioner two venue options, one of which is any superior court of conviction and the other is the superior court in the county of the petitioner's residence. King County Superior Court, as a superior court of conviction, was an appropriate venue for Manuel to obtain a full restoration of his firearm rights. We reverse and remand for entry of an order restoring Manuel's firearm rights.

FACTS

¶3 Manuel has nine convictions that led to the entry of orders prohibiting him from possessing firearms under RCW 9.41.040. Manuel, a Pierce County resident, was convicted in Pierce County Superior Court of seven felony offenses between 1998 and 2004. On July 13, 2006, the King County Superior Court convicted Manuel of burglary and revoked his right to possess firearms. In 2010, Manuel was convicted of a separate, domestic violence misdemeanor offense in Lakewood Municipal Court.

¶4 On April 21, 2019, Manuel filed a petition to restore his right to possess firearms with the King County Superior Court under the same cause number as his 2006 felony conviction. The State agreed that Manuel is statutorily eligible to have his firearm rights restored but argued that King County Superior Court "lacks jurisdiction to grant the petitioner's request on the eight Pierce County Convictions" under RCW 9.41.040(4)(b).

¶5 The trial court found Manuel was eligible for restoration under the conditions set forth by RCW 9.41.040(4)(a). The court additionally found that it was the court of record that ordered Manuel's prohibition on possession of a firearm for his 2006 prohibition, but was neither the court of record that ordered the prohibition on possession of a firearm on the remaining convictions nor the superior court in the county in which Manuel resides. The trial court entered an order restoring Manuel's firearm rights only relating to the King County conviction. Manuel appeals the denial of a full restoration of his firearm rights.

ANALYSIS

A. RCW 9.41.040(b) does not limit superior court jurisdiction

¶6 Manuel contends King County Superior Court has the authority to restore his firearm rights as to any and all of his convictions under RCW 9.41.040(4)(b)(i). RCW 9.41.040(4)(b) provides:

(b) An individual may petition a court of record to have his or her right to possess a firearm restored under (a) of this subsection (4) only at:

(i) The court of record that ordered the petitioner's prohibition on possession of a firearm; or

(ii) The superior court in the county in which the petitioner resides.

¶7 The State does not dispute that King County Superior Court is a "court of record" and it was a court that ordered Manuel's prohibition on the possession of a firearm. But it argues King County Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to fully restore Manuel's firearm rights because it was not "the" court of record that prohibited Manuel's possession of firearms as to his Pierce County and Lakewood convictions. We conclude the statute cannot be read to limit King County Superior Court's jurisdiction.

¶8 Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo. Crosby v. Spokane County, 137 Wash.2d 296, 301, 971 P.2d 32 (1999). Jurisdiction refers to the court's power and authority to act. ZDI Gaming, Inc. v. Wash. State Gambling Comm'n, 173 Wash.2d 608, 616, 268 P.3d 929 (2012). Article IV, section 6 of the Washington State Constitution defines the superior court's jurisdiction and grants to it original jurisdiction over a broad category of cases. Id. The legislature may not change that jurisdiction without amending the constitution. Id. And while the legislature may specify the appropriate venue for a particular dispute to be resolved, they may not pass legislation to limit the subject matter jurisdiction of superior courts county by county.¹ See, e.g., id.; Dougherty v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 150 Wash.2d 310, 317, 76 P.3d 1183 (2003) ; Young v. Clark, 149 Wash.2d 130, 133, 65 P.3d 1192 (2003) ; Shoop v. Kittitas County, 149 Wash.2d 29, 37, 65 P.3d 1194 (2003) ; J.A. v. State, 120 Wash. App. 654, 657-58, 86 P.3d 202 (2004).

¶9 In ZDI Gaming, the supplier of pull-tab machines filed a petition in Pierce County Superior Court, challenging Gaming Commission regulations and its decision that ZDI's machines violated those regulations. 173 Wash.2d at 614, 268 P.3d 929. The State contended that RCW 9.46.095, which provided that "[n]o court of the state of Washington other than the superior court of Thurston county shall have jurisdiction over any action or proceeding against the commission," granted exclusive jurisdiction to only that superior court. Id. at 616, 268 P.3d 929.

¶10 The Supreme Court rejected the State's interpretation because it would result in the statute being unconstitutional under article IV, section 6. Id. at 619, 268 P.3d 929.

Just as our constitution does not allow the legislature to decree that only King County judges have subject matter jurisdiction to hear child dependency actions or that only Pend Oreille County judges have subject matter jurisdiction to hear shareholder derivative actions, our constitution does not allow the legislature to decree that only Thurston County judges have subject matter jurisdiction to hear cases involving the Gaming Commission.

Id. The Supreme Court concluded it could interpret the statute as constitutional by deeming it to be a venue provision, rather than a jurisdictional limit. Id.

¶11 Under the reasoning of ZDI Gaming, we cannot interpret RCW 9.41.040(b) as a jurisdictional restriction and must, instead, interpret it as a venue provision. As a result, King County Superior Court had the jurisdiction to adjudicate Manuel's petition. The sole question before us is whether venue was proper in King County Superior Court.

B. RCW 9.41.040(b)(i) makes King County Superior Court a proper venue for Manuel's restoration petition

¶12 Manuel contends that, under RCW 9.41.040(4)(b)(i), he had the right to file his petition in King County Superior Court and nothing in the language of the statute suggests he must travel around the state and file petitions in separate jurisdictions to obtain a full restoration of his firearm rights. We agree with Manuel.

¶13 Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. State v. Swanson, 116 Wash. App. 67, 70, 65 P.3d 343 (2003). The purpose of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislature's intent, which is derived solely from the statute's plain language. State v. Dennis, 191 Wash.2d 169, 172, 421 P.3d 944 (2018). Courts discern plain language by considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Id. at 172-73, 421 P.3d 944.

¶14 If there is more than one reasonable interpretation of a statute's plain language, then it is ambiguous. Swanson, 116 Wash. App. at 70, 65 P.3d 343. If a statute is ambiguous, then the court relies on principles of statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law to determine legislative intent. Payseno v. Kitsap County, 186 Wash. App. 465, 469, 346 P.3d 784 (2015). After such analysis, if a criminal statute still remains ambiguous, the rule of lenity requires courts to construe the statute strictly in favor of the defendant. Id. at 470, 346 P.3d 784.

¶15 We conclude King County Superior Court is an appropriate venue for Manuel to petition for the full restoration of his firearm possession rights. First, the statute is ambiguous and can be reasonably read as both Manuel and the State propose. The plain language of RCW 9.41.040(4)(b)(i) does not answer whether one superior court of conviction may fully restore firearm rights lost as the result of convictions in two or more counties. Second, the duty to restore firearm rights is ministerial and there is no basis for deferring to a Pierce County judge as to whether Manuel is eligible for the restoration of his gun rights. Finally, the rule of lenity supports construing the statute in Manuel's favor.

1. RCW 9.41.040(4)(b)(i) is ambiguous

¶16 Manuel and the State both contend RCW 9.41.040(4)(b)(i) is unambiguous and not susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. We disagree.

¶17 In State v. Swanson, this court had the opportunity to interpret RCW 9.41.040 to determine if it gives a superior court the discretion to deny a restoration petition. 116 Wash. App. at 70, 65 P.3d 343. In resolving this question, the court recognized that the statute was "not a model of clarity" and found its plain language "unhelpful." Id. at 70-71, 65 P.3d 343. The court noted that while the statute enumerated requirements for restoration, it did not "espouse any procedure to be followed," did not set time limits for filing such a petition, did not refer to any applicable burden of proof, and did not expressly confer or refer to the court's discretion. Id. at 71, 65 P.3d 343.

¶18 Here, the venue provision is similarly ambiguous because it does not address the situation presented...