State v. Thomas, A15-0708

891 N.W.2d 612

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Quintin Lynn THOMAS, Appellant.

A15-0708

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: March 22, 2017

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Gunnar B. Johnson, Duluth City Attorney, Joanne R. Piper-Maurer, Marcus E. Jones, Assistant City Attorneys, Duluth, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Charles F. Clippert, Assistant Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

Syllabus by the Court

OPINION

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

The question presented in this case is whether a district court may allow the State to reopen its case-in-chief before ruling on the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the State's case. After the State rested, appellant Quintin Lynn Thomas made a motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the charged offense. In response, the State asked to reopen its case-in-chief. The district court granted the State's request before considering Thomas' motion for judgment of acquittal. After granting the State's request to reopen, the court denied Thomas' motion for judgment of acquittal and the jury found Thomas guilty. Because we conclude that the district court did not err when it granted the State's motion to reopen its case-in-chief before considering Thomas' motion for judgment of acquittal, we affirm.

FACTS

Thomas was arrested for being in physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Around 4 a.m., a police officer noticed a pickup truck with its engine running. When the officer approached the truck, he found Thomas asleep in the front seat, with the keys in the ignition and the engine running. The officer woke Thomas and observed indicia of intoxication. He asked Thomas to perform field sobriety tests, which Thomas did not pass. The officer arrested Thomas and took him to the police station, where another officer administered a breath test that showed Thomas' blood alcohol concentration at .16 just before 5 a.m.

The State charged Thomas with gross misdemeanor second-degree driving while impaired, Minn. Stat. § 169A.25, subd. 1(a) (2016) (defining second-degree driving while impaired as operating or being in physical control of a motor vehicle within two hours of having a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or more if the offense is committed within 10 years of "two or more aggravating factors").¹ According to the State, Thomas' offense was a gross misdemeanor because Thomas committed the current offense within 10 years of his commission of two qualifying prior impaired driving incidents. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 3 (2016).² Specifically, the State relied on Thomas' 2007 Minnesota loss of license, related to impaired driving, and his 2006 Wisconsin conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated.

Thomas pleaded not guilty and his case went to trial. During pre-trial proceedings, defense counsel advised Thomas to stipulate to the two prior impaired driving incidents, explaining on the record that the State would likely be able to establish those incidents. Defense counsel showed Thomas certified copies of his driving record, which included the 2007 loss of license, and a certified copy of his 2006 Wisconsin conviction. The State pre-marked the certified copies as Exhibits 2 and 3. Thomas declined to stipulate to the prior incidents. In the same pre-trial proceeding, the State agreed to redact certain portions of the certified copies.

The matter then proceeded to trial. The State presented its case-in-chief, calling two witnesses—the police officers involved in the case—to show that Thomas was in physical control of a motor vehicle within 2 hours of having a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or more. But the State rested without offering the certified copies showing Thomas' prior impaired driving incidents.

Outside the jury's presence, Thomas made a "motion for a directed verdict to the charge of second degree DWI."³

Thomas argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the charged offense without the certified copies showing the prior incidents. The prosecutor responded that she had the certified copies "here." The district court ordered a short recess to look into case law on "this very issue."

When the proceedings resumed, the State asked to reopen its case-in-chief to offer the certified copies into evidence in accordance with Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 12(g), which provides that "[i]n the interests of justice, the court may allow any party to reopen that party's case to offer additional evidence." Defense counsel agreed that "a motion to reopen for submission of additional evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court," but argued that it did not serve the interests of justice to allow the State to reopen its case when the State realized its mistake only because of Thomas' motion for judgment of acquittal.

After hearing from both sides, the district court granted the State's motion to reopen. The court relied on case law and the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure to conclude that it had the discretion to allow the State to reopen its case-in-chief to submit the omitted evidence. The court reasoned that Thomas had ample notice that his 2007 loss of license and 2006 prior conviction were going to be part of the case against him, and that the State failed to offer the evidence through inadvertence. Having granted the State's motion to reopen, the court indicated that it was denying Thomas' motion for acquittal "at this point on that basis."

The State then offered the certified copies showing Thomas' prior impaired driving incidents, which the district court received without objection. The State rested once again. Thomas indicated on the record that he would not have presented a defense had the district court granted his motion for judgment of acquittal. But given that the district court denied the motion, Thomas chose to testify.

Thomas told the jury that the evening before his arrest, he went to a funeral and then to a bar, where he drank three or four whiskeys with a beer chaser. While at the bar, he received a call around midnight asking him to make repairs to a pickup truck a few blocks away. After he made the repairs, his pre-arranged ride did not arrive and his cell phone died. He stood outside until he got cold, and then got into the truck and fell asleep. He awoke a few hours later and felt cold, so he started the truck for heat and fell asleep in the driver's seat, which is where the police officer found him around 4 a.m.

The jury found Thomas guilty as charged. The district court convicted Thomas and stayed execution of his 365-day sentence for 2 years. Thomas appealed from the judgment of conviction, challenging the district court's decision to allow the State to reopen its case before considering his motion for judgment of acquittal. The court of appeals affirmed. State v. Thomas , 882 N.W.2d 640, 648-49 (Minn.App.2016). The court of appeals concluded that the district court did not err when it granted the State's motion to reopen its case-in-chief before considering Thomas' motion for judgment of acquittal. Id. at 647. We granted Thomas' petition for review.⁴

ANALYSIS

Thomas argues that the district court erred when it allowed the State to reopen its case-in-chief before considering his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case. Thomas' argument has two parts. Thomas first contends that under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 18(1), the district court was required to immediately rule on his motion for judgment of acquittal before considering the State's motion to reopen its case-in-chief. Next, he argues that even if the district court was not required to immediately rule on his motion for judgment of acquittal, the court abused its discretion under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 12(g), when it allowed the State to reopen its case-in-chief in response to his motion for judgment of acquittal.⁵ We consider each argument in turn.

I.

Thomas argues that Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 18, required the district court to immediately rule on his motion for judgment of acquittal before considering the State's motion to reopen its case-in-chief. We interpret rules of procedure de novo and "follow a rule's plain language when it is unambiguous." State v. Lugo , 887 N.W.2d 476, 482 (Minn.2016). The rules must be read as a whole, State v. Underdahl , 767 N.W.2d 677, 682 (Minn.2009), and "in light of one another," Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith , 754 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Minn.2008). We do not "add words or phrases to unambiguous statutes or rules." Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A. , 851 N.W.2d 598, 604 (Minn.2014).

Under Rule 26.03, subdivision 18(1)(a), "[a]t the close of evidence for either party, the defendant may move for ... a judgment of acquittal on one or more of the charges if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction." A court's ability to reserve its ruling on such a motion depends on whether the motion is made at the close of the State's case or at the close of the defendant's case. When the defendant makes a motion for acquittal at the close of the State's case, "the court must rule on the motion." Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 18(2). But when the defendant's motion is made at the close of the defendant's case, "the court may reserve ruling on the motion, submit the case to the jury, and rule before or after verdict." Id. Because the court is able to "reserve" ruling on the motion only when the motion is made at the close of the defendant's case, Thomas argues that the court had no authority to defer ruling on his motion, which was made at the close of the State's case. And, focusing on the phrase "must rule on the motion," Thomas contends that the plain language of Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 18(2), requires a district court to immediately rule on a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the State's...