Susan B. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

551 F.Supp.3d 107

SUSAN B., Plaintiff,

v.COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

1:20-CV-00546 EAW

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed July 30, 2021

Kenneth R. Hiller, Mary Ellen Gill, Law Offices of Kenneth Hiller, Amherst, NY, for Plaintiff.

Joshua L. Kershner, Social Security Administration Office of General Counsel, New York, NY, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, Chief Judge

INTRODUCTION

Represented by counsel, Plaintiff Susan B. ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner," or "Defendant") denying her applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI"). (Dkt. 1). This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Presently before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Dkt. 13; Dkt. 14), and Plaintiff's reply (Dkt. 16). For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner's motion (Dkt. 14) is granted and Plaintiff's motion (Dkt. 13) is denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff protectively filed her application for DIB on March 22, 2017 and, thereafter, she filed a claim for SSI on March 27, 2017. (Dkt. 10 at 15, 68-69).¹ In her applications, Plaintiff alleged disability beginning November 1, 2016, due to bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, knee issues (including her left knee, which needed replacement), and difficulty sleeping. (Id. at 15, 71, 83). Plaintiff's applications were initially denied on July 11, 2017. (Id. at 15, 96-110). A video hearing was held before administrative law judge ("ALJ") David J. Begley on December 12, 2018. (Id. at 15, 32-67). Plaintiff appeared in Buffalo, New York and the ALJ presided over the hearing from Alexandria, Virginia. (Id. ). On March 12, 2019, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Id. at 12-27). Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review; her request was denied on March 19, 2020, making the ALJ's determination the Commissioner's final decision. (Id. at 4-6). This action followed.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. District Court Review

"In reviewing a final decision of the [Social Security Administration ("SSA")], this Court is limited to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard." Talavera v. Astrue , 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Act holds that a decision by the Commissioner is "conclusive" if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Moran v. Astrue , 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). It is not the Court's function to "determine de novo whether [the claimant] is disabled." Schaal v. Apfel , 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted); see also Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. , 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that review of the Secretary's decision is not de novo and that the Secretary's findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence). However, "[t]he deferential standard of review for substantial evidence does not apply to the Commissioner's conclusions of law." Byam v. Barnhart , 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Townley v. Heckler , 748 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1984) ).

II. Disability Determination

An ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Bowen v. City of New York , 476 U.S. 467, 470-71, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986). At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has an impairment, or combination of impairments, that is "severe" within the meaning of the Act, in that it imposes significant restrictions on the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities. Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the analysis concludes with a finding of "not disabled." If the claimant does have at least one severe impairment, the ALJ continues to step three.

At step three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant's impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 (the "Listings"). Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a Listing and meets the durational requirement (id. §§ 404.1509, 416.909), the claimant is disabled. If not, the ALJ determines the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), which is the ability to perform physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for the collective impairments. See id. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).

The ALJ then proceeds to step four and determines whether the claimant's RFC permits the claimant to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If the claimant can perform such requirements, then he or she is not disabled. If he or she cannot, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, wherein the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant is not disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). To do so, the Commissioner must present evidence to demonstrate that the claimant "retains a residual functional capacity to perform alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy" in light of the claimant's age, education, and work experience. Rosa v. Callahan , 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c).

DISCUSSION

I. The ALJ's Decision

In determining whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. Initially, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2021. (Dkt. 10 at 17). At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful work activity since November 1, 2016, the alleged onset date. (Id. at 18).

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of: "osteoarthritis-knees ; obesity ; and psychiatric impairments alternatively diagnosed as bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)." (Id. ). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments of obstructive sleep apnea and right hand and lower back pain were non-severe. (Id. ).

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any Listing. (Id. ). The ALJ particularly considered the criteria of Listings 1.00, 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15, as well as considering the effect of Plaintiff's obesity as required by Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 02-1p. (Id. at 18-20).

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), with the additional limitations that Plaintiff:

is prohibited from climbing ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. She is further limited to occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. She would need to avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold. She also would need to avoid concentrated slippery and uneven surfaces as well as hazardous machinery, unprotected heights, and open flames.

Additionally, she is limited to doing simple routine, repetitive tasks. She is further limited to work in a low stress job defined as being free of fast-paced production requirements, no hazardous conditions, occasional decision-making required, and occasional changes in the work setting. Finally, she is limited to occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors and no direct interaction with the general public.

(Id. at 20). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. (Id. at 25).

At step five, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE") to conclude that, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including the representative occupations of small parts assembler, laundry folder, and warehouse checker. (Id. at 26). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Act. (Id. at 26-27).

II. The Commissioner's Determination is Supported by Substantial Evidence and Free from Legal Error

Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse or, in the alternative, remand this matter to the Commissioner, arguing that (1) the ALJ did not properly weigh the opinion offered by Licensed Master Social Worker (LMSW) Amber Halverson, because he downplayed her treatment relationship with Plaintiff, failed to obtain her complete treatment notes, and did not properly consider the regulatory factors, and (2) the physical RFC was not supported by substantial evidence, because the opinion offered by Hongbiao Liu, M.D. was vague, and the ALJ otherwise failed to explain how he arrived at the specific limitations in the RFC. (Dkt. 13-1 at 1, 13-18). The Court has considered each of these arguments and, for the reasons discussed below, finds them without merit.

A. Weighing of Ms. Halverson's Opinion

Plaintiff's first argument is that the ALJ erred in evaluating the opinion offered by Ms. Halverson. (Dkt. 13-1 at 13). In assessing...