United States v. Campbell-Martin

17 F.4th 807

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee

v.Christin CAMPBELL-MARTIN, Defendant - Appellant

United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee

v.Adam Scott Leiva, Defendant - Appellee

No. 20-3054

No. 20-3181

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: September 24, 2021

Filed: November 8, 2021

Counsel who presented argument and appeared on the brief on behalf of the appellant Christin Campbell-Martin, in 20-3054, was Webb L. Wassmer, of Marion, IA. Counsel who presented argument and appeared on the brief on behalf of the appellant Adam Leiva, in 20-3181, was Mark C. Meyer, of Cedar Rapids, IA.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee was Mark Tremmel, AUSA, of Cedar Rapids, IA. The following attorney appeared on the appellee brief; Melissa Carrington, AUSA, of Cedar Rapids, IA.

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Christin Campbell-Martin and Adam Leiva conditionally pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance near a protected location and aiding and abetting the possession with intent to distribute after the district court¹ denied their motions to suppress methamphetamine discovered during a warrantless search of a vehicle. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 ; 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 860(a). Campbell-Martin and Leiva appeal, challenging the denial of their suppression motion and the district court's sentencing guidelines calculations. We affirm.

I.

On May 25, 2018, at 10:27 p.m., Officer Nicole Hotz was patrolling a school parking lot and asking people to leave because suspicious activity had been occurring there overnight. Officer Hotz noticed a vehicle pull into the lot. She pulled up near the vehicle and parked two spots away from it so that she could ask the occupants to leave. A woman later identified as Christin Campbell-Martin was sitting in the driver's seat and seemed to be hiding her face with her hands. Officer Hotz shined a spotlight on the driver's side window to get the woman's attention and then walked up to the window. The woman rolled down the window and Officer Hotz noticed that "she was very nervous and fidgety"; "[h]er speech was quick"; and "her pupils were constricted," which Officer Hotz thought was unusual in the dark. Officer Hotz also noticed that the woman "kept pulling her knees to her chest and breathing really heavy." Officer Hotz thought that the woman might be under the influence of drugs. Officer Hotz also thought it was strange that the two male passengers were very quiet and did not look toward her.

When Officer Hotz requested everyone's identification, the woman in the driver's seat and the man in the front passenger seat stated that their names were "Shannon Mckelvy" and "Favian Estrada" but denied having identification. Officer Hotz then asked, "What's going on? Run me through. Something's going on right now." The woman said that the two passengers picked her up because her boyfriend was "beating the crap out of" her, causing Officer Hotz to ask her if she was okay. Neither knew the last four digits of their social-security number, which Officer Hotz thought was strange. Officer Hotz ran "Estrada's" name and discovered that it was false and that his real name was Adam Leiva, so she arrested him for providing false identification information. See Iowa Code § 719.1A (2018).

Sergeant Richard Holland arrived to assist Officer Hotz and asked "Mckelvy" if a purse in the back seat belonged to her. She said it did not and refused to give Sergeant Holland permission to search it. Because the man in the back seat said he was the one who had been lent the car, Officer Hotz asked him to look for identification in the purse. When he found "Mckelvy's" identification stating that her real name was Christin Campbell-Martin, the officers arrested her for providing false identification information.

Sergeant Holland decided to impound the car and asked the man in the back seat to exit the vehicle. After the man got out of the car, Officer Holland started to search the vehicle and found a backpack on the floor of the front-seat passenger area. Inside of the backpack he found a bag of what he thought was methamphetamine. He also found $2,850.10 in cash, a small scoop, paperwork addressed to Leiva and Campbell-Martin, and smaller baggies. In the center console he found Leiva's identification. After he finished searching, the car was impounded.

A federal grand jury indicted Campbell-Martin and Leiva on one count of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance near a protected location and aiding and abetting the possession with intent to distribute. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 ; 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 860(a). Campbell-Martin and Leiva moved to suppress the methamphetamine found in the car, arguing that the initial encounter was an unconstitutional seizure because Officer Hotz did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion and that the warrantless search of the vehicle and its contents was an unconstitutional search. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the defendants were not seized when Officer Hotz first approached them, Officer Hotz had probable cause to command them to exit the car and arrest them, and the search of the car was a valid inventory search and search incident to arrest.

Campbell-Martin and Leiva conditionally pleaded guilty, preserving their right to appeal the denial of their suppression motion. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). At sentencing, the district court denied Campbell-Martin's motion for a two-level minor-role reduction in her offense level, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b), applied a two-level enhancement to Leiva's offense level because the drug offense directly involved a protected location, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.2(a)(1), and assessed three criminal-history points for Leiva's prior methamphetamine-possession offense. The district court sentenced Campbell-Martin to 200 months’ imprisonment and 10 years’ supervised release and Leiva to 235 months’ imprisonment and 10 years’ supervised release. Campbell-Martin and Leiva appeal, challenging the district court's denial of their suppression motion and its sentencing guidelines calculations.

II.

First, the defendants challenge the district court's denial of the suppression motion. "In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error, giving due weight to the inferences police drew from those facts. We review de novo the district court's legal conclusion that reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed." United States v. Pacheco , 996 F.3d 508, 511 (8th Cir. 2021).

The defendants challenge the district court's suppression denial on two grounds. First, Campbell-Martin argues that the initial stop was an unconstitutional seizure because it was conducted without reasonable suspicion and thus the methamphetamine must be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." See United States v. Tuton , 893 F.3d 562, 568 (8th Cir. 2018). Second, Campbell-Martin and Leiva argue that the warrantless search of the car was unconstitutional because neither the inventory exception nor the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement applies.

A.

We first consider whether Officer Hotz's approach to the car constituted an unconstitutional seizure. A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when an officer "by means of physical force or show of authority[ ] has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen." Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). "[T]he crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would ‘have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.’ " Florida v. Bostick , 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut , 486 U.S. 567, 569, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988) ). To determine whether an encounter is a seizure, we must consider all the relevant circumstances. United States v. Mabery , 686 F.3d 591, 596 (8th Cir. 2012). Circumstances that suggest a seizure occurred are "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Id.

Officers must obtain a warrant to conduct a seizure unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. Terry , 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Under one exception, "officers may conduct brief investigatory stops of individuals if they have a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity." United States v. Griffith , 533 F.3d 979, 983-84 (8th Cir. 2008). "A law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion [to conduct an investigatory stop] when the officer is aware of particularized, objective facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant suspicion that a crime is being committed." United States v. Williams , 929 F.3d 539, 544 (8th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, we consider the totality of the circumstances. Pacheco , 996 F.3d at 512.

Considering all the relevant circumstances, Officer Hotz's initial encounter with Campbell-Martin and Leiva was not a Fourth Amendment seizure because it was a consensual encounter. Even if it became nonconsensual, Officer Hotz had reasonable suspicion to question them and ask for identification.

Officer Hotz's conduct would not have communicated to a reasonable person that he could not leave. Officer Hotz was alone, she did not display a weapon, she did not touch the defendants, and she did not use forceful language. She parked beside the car rather than in front of or behind it so the driver...