United States v. Thomas

434 F.Supp.3d 576

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff

v.Kenneth Lloyd THOMAS, Defendant

CIVIL ACTION NO: 3:19-CR-00024-JHM

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division.

Signed January 21, 2020

Filed January 22, 2020

Larry E. Fentress, Randy Ream, U.S. Attorney Office, Louisville, KY, for Plaintiff.

Chastity R. Beyl, Donald J. Meier, Western Kentucky Federal Community Defender, Inc., Louisville, KY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Joseph H. McKinley Jr., Senior Judge This matter is before the Court on Defendant Kenneth Thomas's Motion to Suppress Evidence. [DN 15]. The Court held a hearing on this matter on October 7, 2019. Fully briefed, this matter is ripe for decision. For the following reasons, Mr. Thomas's Motion is GRANTED .

I. BACKGROUND

On October 4, 2018, shortly after 7:00 p.m., Mr. Thomas was driving a 2006 Chevy Tahoe in Louisville, Kentucky, when his vehicle was pulled over by members of the Ninth Mobile Unit of the Louisville Metro Police Department. Detectives William Mayo, Jonathan Robbins, and Curt Flynn pulled behind Mr. Thomas's vehicle at a red light. Detective Mayo testified at the suppression hearing that because of the time of day, he could plainly observe through the Tahoe's rear window that neither the driver nor the two passengers were wearing seatbelts. [DN 24 at 6:8–6:24]. After the light changed, the officers followed the Tahoe for roughly 30 seconds before initiating a traffic stop. Once both vehicles were stopped, Detective Mayo approached the driver's side of the vehicle and asked the occupants to roll down their windows while Detective Robbins approached the right side of the vehicle.

After getting the occupants' identification, the officers checked whether anyone in the vehicle had an outstanding warrant. The check revealed that Mr. Thomas had a warrant out of Pennsylvania. The officers began to check what the warrant was for and whether it was extraditable. Detective Mayo then made the decision that he was going to get Mr. Thomas out of the vehicle. The detective approached Mr. Thomas's window and asked him to step out of the car. When Mr. Thomas questioned why such a request was made, Detective Mayo referred to two Supreme Court cases granting him the right to order the driver and any passengers out of a vehicle during a traffic stop. Two minutes later, Mr. Thomas agreed and voluntarily exited the vehicle. Both the front and rear passengers also exited and were asked to come to the back of the vehicle for questioning. When the front passenger exited the vehicle, Lieutenant King—another officer who arrived on scene separately—discovered a corked bottle thereafter identified as some type of alcohol in plain view.

Based on the alcohol container, Lieutenant King began searching the front seat passenger area. When Detective Mayo stepped back to the driver side door a few minutes later, he asked whether the lieutenant had a basis to search the vehicle. Lieutenant King responded that they found an open container, an answer which appeared to satisfy Detective Mayo as he walked back to the rear of the car to continue talking to Mr. Thomas and his passengers. The lieutenant testified at the hearing that he limited his search to only other open alcohol containers because the open container served as the basis for the search. [Id. at 85:17–19]. After completing a search of the front passenger area and finding nothing of note, Lieutenant King moved to the rear, right passenger area and began his search. After picking up two vests in the back seat, Lieutenant King identified something heavy in the second vest. He searched the pockets, looking for the source of the weight, and discovered a .380 caliber Remington pistol—the firearm that is the subject of this motion. One of Mr. Thomas's occupants claimed ownership of the first vest, but Mr. Thomas said the second vest—the one in which the gun was found—belonged to one of their motorcycle club brothers. Upon a further search of the second vest, Lieutenant King also found the title to a motorcycle. The title was in Mr. Thomas's name. The officers on scene also understood that Mr. Thomas was a convicted felon. At that point, the decision was made to arrest him.

Mr. Thomas was indicted on February 20, 2019, on a single count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. [DN 1]. He filed the instant Motion to Suppress on August 14, 2019. [DN 15]. The Court held a hearing on the matter on October 7, 2019. Thereafter, the United States submitted a Post-Hearing Brief. [DN 26]. Mr. Thomas responded asserting three separate and distinct grounds upon which the Court may find that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. [DN 29]. The United States did not reply.

II. DISCUSSION

As support for the Motion to Suppress, Mr. Thomas submits three arguments. Specifically, Mr. Thomas argues that: (1) "the scope and duration of the stop exceeded its purpose"; (2) "the commission of a violation, i.e. having an open container in a vehicle, under Kentucky law, does not constitute a crime and, therefore, there is no evidence of a crime or contraband for which the officers had a basis to search the vehicle"; and (3) "even if the officers had the right to search the vehicle based upon the open container, they exceeded the scope" of a legal search by reaching into the vest pocket based purely on the vest's weight. [Id. at 11].

A. Scope and Duration

Mr. Thomas does not argue—nor could he—that the traffic stop was invalid at its outset. Even if the officers' decision to stop the vehicle for a traffic violation was pretextual, as is alluded to in Mr. Thomas's Response brief, "the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops [under the Fourth Amendment does not] depend[ ] on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved." Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Mr. Thomas does not contest the accusation that the occupants of the vehicle were not wearing seatbelts.

"The question of whether a particular traffic stop passes constitutional muster is analyzed under ‘the standard for temporary detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio , and its progeny.’ " United States v. Winters , 782 F.3d 289, 295–96 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Everett , 601 F.3d 484, 488 (6th Cir. 2010) ) (internal citation omitted). A seizure that is lawful at its inception, like the stop in this case, "can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution." Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). The Terry framework provides that a traffic stop "must ... last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop," and "the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time." Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983).

Mr. Thomas premises his challenge to the scope and duration of the stop on Detective Mayo removing him from his vehicle. [DN 29 at 11–15]. Specifically, Mr. Thomas argues that "[w]hen the Court properly applies a totality of the circumstances analysis, ... it is obvious that there was no safety concern by Det. Mayo when he pulled Mr. Thomas and his passenger from the vehicle." [Id. at 14]. The United States, in turn, relies on Supreme Court case law that grants officers the right to ask drivers and their passengers to exit a vehicle during a traffic stop due to officer safety concerns. [DN 26 at 6–7 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms , 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) ; Maryland v. Wilson , 519 U.S. 408, 413–14, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) ) ].

Just after six minutes into the stop, Detective Mayo's body camera footage reveals him making the decision to remove Mr. Thomas from the vehicle. Two minutes later, after an exchange between Detective Mayo and Mr. Thomas, Mr. Thomas can be seen exiting his vehicle. Upon exiting the vehicle, Detective Mayo informed Mr. Thomas that the reason he asked him to step out was because he had a warrant out of Pennsylvania. Detective Mayo explained that it appeared the warrant was non-extraditable but that his fellow officers were double-checking that fact. Detective Mayo further explained that sometimes during traffic stops when an officer informs a driver that he or she has an outstanding warrant, the driver attempts to flee, creating a safety concern for both the officers on scene as well as the driver and any occupants of the vehicle. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that traffic stops "are ‘especially fraught with danger to police officers.’ " Arizona v. Johnson , 555 U.S. 323, 330, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009) (quoting Michigan v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032, 1047, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) ). "As a result, police officers may order drivers and passengers out of the automobile during the traffic stop without offending the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Noble , 762 F.3d 509, 521 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Wilson , 519 U.S. at 414, 117 S.Ct. 882 ). "As explained in Mimms and Johnson , the legitimate and weighty interest in police officer safety outweighs the de minimis additional intrusion of requiring a driver who is already lawfully stopped to get out of the car." United States v. Ware , 465 F. App'x 487, 494 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Mimms , 434 U.S. at 110–11, 98 S.Ct. 330 ). Here, the Court believes that it was reasonable for Detective Mayo to ask Mr. Thomas to step out of his vehicle based on a concern for officer safety related to the warrant.

Mr. Thomas's argument about the necessity to consider the totality of the circumstances in reaching a decision, while well-taken, does not change the Court's decision. The Court finds that, upon evaluating the circumstances, the scope and duration of the traffic stop were reasonable. Accordingly, Detective...