United States v. Venezia

995 F.3d 1170

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.Hunter Trey VENEZIA, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 19-1432

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

FILED May 3, 2021

Dean Sanderford, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Virginia L. Grady, Federal Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Office of the Federal Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.

Elizabeth S. Ford Milani, Assistant United States Attorney (Jason R. Dunn, United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before McHUGH, BALDOCK, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.

BRISCOE, Circuit Judge.

This is a direct appeal by Hunter Venezia following his conditional plea to one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii). Specifically, Venezia challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence found after a traffic stop led to the impoundment and search of the vehicle he was driving. Venezia moved to suppress the evidence recovered from the search, arguing the officers’ impoundment of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court was correct in concluding the impoundment was constitutional. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse the district court's denial of Venezia's motion to suppress and remand with directions to vacate Venezia's conviction and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History

On January 2, 2019, at about 9:00 p.m., Officers David Tubbs and Jason Jewkes, two members of the Lakewood Police Department ("LPD"), were conducting a routine patrol in Lakewood, Colorado. They observed an Audi pull into the parking lot of a motel and then drive to a gas station across the street. Along the way, the driver—who was later determined to be Venezia—committed a traffic violation by failing to signal a turn. The vehicle soon returned to the motel parking lot, and as it did so, the officers observed that the front and rear license plates were not properly affixed to the vehicle's front and rear bumpers; instead, the plates were improperly displayed in the passenger compartment. The officers ran the license plate number through their identification systems, which revealed the vehicle's registered owner was a person named Luis Cuello.

Venezia then parked the vehicle in the motel's private lot. The vehicle was "legally parked," was "not obstructing traffic," and did not pose "an imminent threat to public safety." ROA Vol. 5 at 140. The motel and its parking lot were in a high crime area of Lakewood.

The officers approached the vehicle based on the illegal turn they had observed. The officers asked Venezia, the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle, for his license, registration, and insurance. He did not have a driver's license, registration for the vehicle, car insurance, title to the vehicle, or a bill of sale. Venezia told the officers his license was suspended; the officers confirmed that, in fact, his license had been revoked. Venezia presented the officers with his Colorado identification card, and the officers determined he had an outstanding misdemeanor warrant for "a failure to appear on a traffic ticket." Id. at 75.

When asked about Cuello—i.e., the vehicle's registered owner—Venezia stated he did not recognize the name. He told the officers he had recently purchased the vehicle from a person named Dustin Estep but had been unable to insure or register it due to the holidays. The officers contacted their communication center in an attempt to reach Cuello by telephone, but the attempt was unsuccessful.

At the suppression hearing, the district court found as a matter of fact that Venezia was the vehicle's owner, and that he had recently purchased the vehicle from Estep, who had recently purchased it from Cuello. But the court further found the officers had no information available to them, at the time of their encounter with Venezia, that would have alerted them to this chain of title.

The officers arrested Venezia on the outstanding warrant and impounded the vehicle. Venezia objected to the impoundment. Although he was not a guest at the motel, Venezia indicated that an individual he referred to as his brother was staying there. The officers did not inquire whether Venezia's "brother" (who turned out to be a friend, Christian Kelly) could take possession of the vehicle. The officers also did not ask anyone working at the motel for permission to leave the vehicle in the motel parking lot.

During an inventory search of the vehicle, conducted as part of the impoundment, law enforcement found drugs, drug distribution paraphernalia, a gun holster, and ammunition. Venezia was released on bond, after which he was able to establish his ownership of the vehicle.

B. Procedural History

A grand jury charged Venezia with one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, among other counts not relevant here. Venezia moved to suppress the evidence recovered during the search, including the drugs. The government opposed his motion.

The district court then held a suppression hearing at which Cuello, Estep, Venezia, Officer Tubbs, and Kelly testified. The court denied Venezia's motion in an oral ruling. The court concluded the impoundment was conducted pursuant to the LPD's standardized, written policies and was justified by a community-caretaking rationale. The court accordingly held the impoundment was constitutional.

Venezia entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, reserving the right to appeal the district court's denial of his suppression motion. The district court entered judgment on November 5, 2019. Venezia filed a notice of appeal the following day.

II. DISCUSSION

The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. To be reasonable, a search "generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant." Riley v. California , 573 U.S. 373, 382, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton , 515 U.S. 646, 653, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995) ). "In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement." Id. "The Government bears the burden of proving that the seizure and search were reasonable." United States v. White , 584 F.3d 935, 944 (10th Cir. 2009) ; see also United States v. Sanders , 796 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 2015) ("The government bears the burden of proving that its impoundment of a vehicle satisfies the Fourth Amendment.").

When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we review findings of fact for clear error, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Hernandez , 847 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 2017). We review the determination of whether the search and seizure were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment de novo. Id.

One exception to the warrant requirement is a search or seizure conducted pursuant to police officers’ "community-caretaking functions." In the context of vehicle impoundments, the community-caretaking doctrine arose from the everyday reality that police frequently encounter disabled vehicles or investigate vehicular accidents in which there is no cause to believe that a criminal offense has occurred. Cady v. Dombrowski , 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). Thus, in Cady , the Supreme Court recognized that police may impound a vehicle where the vehicle was disabled as a result of an accident, the driver could not arrange for the vehicle's removal, and the vehicle's presence "constituted a nuisance along the highway." Id. at 443, 93 S.Ct. 2523.

In South Dakota v. Opperman , 428 U.S. 364, 369, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976), the Supreme Court elaborated by providing several illustrations in which the community-caretaking doctrine justifies impoundment. For example, following a vehicle accident, officers may impound a vehicle "[t]o permit the uninterrupted flow of traffic and in some circumstances to preserve evidence." Id. at 368, 96 S.Ct. 3092. Violation of a parking ordinance may also justify impoundment under the community-caretaking doctrine, provided the parking violation "thereby jeopardize[s] both the public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic." Id. at 369, 96 S.Ct. 3092. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reasoned that "[t]he authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge." Id.

In Colorado v. Bertine , 479 U.S. 367, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987), the Supreme Court addressed inventory searches conducted pursuant to a community-caretaking impoundment. The Court explained that Opperman does not "prohibit[ ] the exercise of police discretion so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity." Id. at 375, 107 S.Ct. 738.

Guided by the Supreme Court's decisions in these cases, we clarified the precise standard for determining the constitutionality of a police-ordered impoundment on private property in Sanders : "when a vehicle is not impeding traffic or impairing public safety, impoundments are constitutional only if guided by both [1] standardized criteria and [2] a legitimate community-caretaking rationale." 796 F.3d at 1243.¹

Here, Venezia argues the officers failed to comply with either requirement, rendering the impoundment unconstitutional for two independently sufficient reasons. The government disagrees. Reviewing de novo, we conclude that the impoundment was guided by standardized criteria, thus satisfying the first prong of Sanders . We also conclude, however, that the impoundment was not guided by a legitimate...