West v. Dep't of Licensing

331 P.3d 72

Arthur WEST, Appellant,

v.DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING, Respondent.

No. 71643–3–I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

June 9, 2014.

Publication Ordered Aug. 1, 2014.

Arthur West, (Appearing Pro Se), Olympia, WA, for Appellant.

Bruce L. Turcott, Office of the Attorney General, Olympia, WA, Dionne Maren Padilla–Huddleston, Office of the Attorney General, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

COX, J.

¶ 1 Arthur West appeals the summary dismissal of his suit brought under the Public Records Act against the Department of Licensing. He contends that the Department violated the Public Records Act by failing to reasonably search for, identify, and produce records related to motor vehicle fuel tax payments to Indian Tribes. West also appeals the order denying his motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment order. The Department properly redacted and withheld information pursuant to a statutory exemption. Its search for records was adequate and timely. The court properly exercised its discretion in denying West's motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, we affirm.

¶ 2 On January 12, 2012, West submitted a Public Records Act request to the Department of Licensing. He sought: (1) “All records showing the total amounts of gas tax money given monthly to each Indian Tribe, 2008 to present”; (2) “All audit reports concerning the expenditure of such funds”; and (3) “All communications concerning the disclosure or witholding [sic] of such records, or the propriety of disclosing or withholding such records, [J]anuary of 2011[t]o present.” The Department of Licensing timely acknowledged receipt of West's request and sought clarification. After West clarified his request, the Department informed him that the estimated date of response was March 9, 2012.

¶ 3 West e-mailed the Department on February 11, 2012 stating that the estimated time period was “unreasonable.” Additionally, he made a second request for disclosure, seeking “any indexes of public records maintained by the department that encompass the gas tax refund amounts, and any applicable retention and destruction schedules.” The Department acknowledged receipt of his second request on February 17, 2012. It informed West that it expected a response could be made on or before February 24, 2012.

¶ 4 On February 24, the Department contacted West to provide a status update on his second public records request. It informed West that it expected to respond on or before March 2, 2012. Three days later, West responded and informed the Department that he considered it to be in violation of the Public Records Act by failing to reasonably disclose the records.

¶ 5 The Department made its first disclosure for West's first request on March 7, 2012. It stated that responsive records to items # 1 and # 2 were exempt from disclosure, and it attached an exemption/redaction log. It also told West that it was reviewing other records to determine whether they were exempt. Additionally, the Department stated that it continued to “search for and review records responsive to item # 3” and that it expected to provide such records to West “no later than March 23, 2012 and in installments as they become available.”

¶ 6 The next day, West sued the Department alleging that it violated the Public Records Act by “failing to reasonably search for, identify, and produce records.”

¶ 7 The Department continued to respond to West's requests throughout the spring and summer. The details of the Department's response are described later in this opinion.

¶ 8 In November 2012, the Department moved for summary judgment. It argued that West's suit was unnecessary, that its search for records was reasonable, that it timely responded to West's requests, that it properly identified each exempt record, and that it properly redacted or withheld records pursuant to a statutory exemption.

¶ 9 West cross-moved for summary judgment and requested a continuance pursuant to CR 56(f). In his motion, he argued that he was forced to file suit and conduct discovery in order to compel the disclosure of records and that the Department's exemptions were improper.

¶ 10 The Department moved for in camera review of the withheld and redacted documents.

¶ 11 The trial court denied West's motion for a continuance, denied the Department's motion for in camera review, and granted the Department's motion for summary judgment.

¶ 12 West moved for reconsideration, and the trial court denied his motion.

¶ 13 West appeals.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE DEPARTMENT

¶ 14 West claims that the trial court erred when it (1) concluded that the Department properly redacted or withheld records pursuant to a statutory exemption, (2) concluded that the Department responded to his requests in a timely manner, and (3) concluded that West's lawsuit was unnecessary to compel production. His arguments are addressed in turn.

¶ 15 Judicial review under the Public Records Act is de novo.¹ Public Records Act cases may be decided on summary judgment.² “Under summary judgment analysis, the appellate court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court: ‘[l]t views the pleadings and affidavits in the file, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and it grants judgment when no material issue of fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” ³

Statutory Exemptions

¶ 16 West argues that the Department improperly withheld and redacted records pursuant to a statutory exemption. Specifically, he contends that these statutes do not exempt disclosure of amounts of money refunded by the state to the tribes. We disagree.

¶ 17 The Public Records Act requires each agency to make available all public records unless the record falls within a Public Records Act exemption or other statutory exemption.⁴ “To the extent necessary to prevent an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy interests protected by the [Public Records Act], the agency shall redact identifying details and produce the remainder of the record.” ⁵ “The burden of proof shall be on the agency to establish that refusal to permit public inspection and copying is in accordance with a statute that exempts or prohibits disclosure in whole or in part of specific information or records.” ⁶

¶ 18 The Public Records Act is a “ ‘strongly worded mandate for broad disclosure of public records.’ ” ⁷ The Act is to be “ ‘liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly construed to promote this public policy and to assure that the public interest will be fully protected.’ ” ⁸

¶ 19 When interpreting a statute, we conduct a de novo review.⁹ We interpret a statute so as to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent.¹⁰ “If the statute's meaning is plain, [the court] give[s] effect to that plain meaning as the expression of the legislature's intent.” ¹¹ “ ‘Statutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous.’ ” ¹²

¶ 20 Under RCW 82.36.450, the State may enter into an agreement with any federally recognized Indian tribe regarding the taxation of motor vehicle fuel on reservation property.¹³ One provision of this statute provides:

(4) Information from the tribe or tribal retailers received by the state or open to state review under the terms of an agreement shall be deemed to be personal information under [RCW 42.56.230(4)(b) ] and exempt from public inspection and copying.¹⁴

¶ 21 RCW 42.56.230(4)(b) provides:

The following personal information is exempt from public inspection and copying under this chapter:

...

(4) Information required of any taxpayer in connection with the assessment or collection of any tax if the disclosure of the information to other persons would: ... (b) violate the taxpayer's right to privacy or result in unfair competitive disadvantage to the taxpayer.

¶ 22 Here, the Department properly withheld and redacted information related to the amounts of gas tax money refunded to a tribe pursuant to these statutory exemptions. The plain language of RCW 82.36.450(4) shows the legislature's intent to protect “information from the tribe,” which it expressly deems “personal information.” The plain language of RCW 42.56.230(4)(b) shows the legislature's intent to protect “[i]information required of [the tribe],” if that information would violate the tribe's right to privacy. Under these statutes, this personal information is plainly exempt from public inspection and copying.

¶ 23 West focuses on the words “from the tribe” in RCW 82.36.450 or “required of any taxpayer” in RCW 42.56.230(4)(b) to argue that the dollar amounts of gas tax money given or refunded to the tribes is fundamentally different information from information received from or required of the tribe, such as numbers of gallons of gasoline, that is used to calculate the refund. He argues that only the latter is exempt under the statutes. This argument is not persuasive.

¶ 24 West's reading of the statutes is too restrictive.

¶ 25 The amount of gas tax money given or refunded to the tribe contains “information required of [the tribe].” Likewise, it contains “information from the tribe.” Whether the State discloses this private information to West in its original form, i.e., the number of gallons of gasoline, or rather, whether it provides the information in the form of a mathematical calculation, i.e., the number of gallons of gasoline is equal to the refund amount divided by the tax rate, the private information is the same. It would simply be disclosed in a different form. Disclosure of such personal information would be contrary to the plain words of the statute. West's arguments that this information is qualitatively different are not convincing.

¶ 26 West contends that Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup is “on point.” ¹⁵ We disagree.

¶ 27 He relies on that case for the assertion that “[e]ven though a public record requestor could work...