Woolsey v. Woolsey

975 N.W.2d 502

In re the Marriage of: Jonathan Richardson WOOLSEY, Appellant,

v.Ruthanne A. WOOLSEY, Respondent.

A20-0749

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: June 15, 2022

Kay Nord Hunt, Michelle K. Kuhl, Lommen Abdo, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.

J. Lee Novelli, Novelli Law Office, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

OPINION

MOORE, III, Justice.

This case asks us to determine whether the district court erred by applying the endangerment standard of the child-custody modification statute, Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(iv) (2020), to a noncustodial parent's motion for joint legal custody of the parties’ child based on their prior stipulation to apply the statutory best-interests standard, as permitted by Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(i) (2020). Minnesota Statutes section 518.18(d) (2020) generally provides that to modify a prior custody order, the court must find a change in circumstances of the child or parties, that modification would serve the child's best interests, and that one of the five additional grounds for modification listed in Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d)(i)–(v) is met. Here, the noncustodial parent's modification motion was expressly predicated on section 518.18(d)(i), which provides that the statutory best-interests standard set forth at Minn. Stat. § 518.17 (2020) applies if the parties previously agreed in a court-approved writing to the application of that standard. The district court instead found that the noncustodial parent failed to establish a prima facie case for a change in custody based on the statutory endangerment standard in section 518.18(d)(iv) and therefore was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion for custody modification. The noncustodial parent challenged the district court's order, and the court of appeals affirmed. Because we conclude the district court erred by requiring the noncustodial parent to establish a prima facie case of endangerment, we reverse the court of appeals decision and remand to Carver County District Court for further proceedings.

FACTS

Appellant Jonathan Woolsey (Father) and respondent Ruthanne Woolsey (Mother) were married and had one daughter, who was born in March 2014. This appeal concerns Father's motion for joint legal custody of the child.

In July 2014, Father filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage. During the dissolution proceeding, the parties—who were both represented by counsel—negotiated a stipulated custody and parenting time agreement, which was incorporated into the dissolution judgment and decree entered by the district court on December 30, 2015. Under their agreement, Mother was granted sole physical and legal custody of the child. Father was granted parenting time, which would gradually increase according to an eight-phase schedule from 2015 to 2017, so long as he continued to receive psychiatric care, took all prescribed medications, and abstained from alcohol consumption. The parties also agreed that "[t]he issue of legal custody may be reviewed by motion of [Father] no earlier than January 1, 2020, and that review will be based upon the best interest standard set forth in Minn. Stat. § 518.17." If Father did not file his motion by January 31, 2020, the agreement stated that he would "permanently waive[ ]" his right to have a change in legal custody decided under the best-interests standard.

Four years later, and within the stipulated-to 1-month window, Father filed a motion for joint legal custody. His motion was exclusively based on the parties’ stipulation for best-interests review of legal custody. In his supporting affidavit, Father asserted that the parties had "mutually agreed that [he] would be able to file a motion to modify legal custody, under a de novo standard of review, and the best interest factors pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 518.17, effective January 1, 2020."

Father's affidavit discussed in detail what had occurred between the parties and the child over the years since the entry of the judgment and decree. Father stated that he had complied with all terms of the judgment and decree and as a result his parenting time had "steadily and consistently expanded." Father further asserted that the parties had been able to "largely agree and peaceably coexist for the best interest of our daughter" and asserted that "[t]here are no current or pending disagreements regarding any legal custody issues" with respect to the "core elements that make up legal child custody": "health care; religion; education." Father's affidavit alleged that the parties had "always agreed" on their daughter's medical care and education, and that the parties had been able to "amicably" agree on matters such as attending church, swapping holidays, and funding the child's birthday celebrations. Father's affidavit discussed each of the statutory joint legal custody and best-interests factors, and argued that under a "de novo" review, an award of joint legal custody would be in their daughter's best interest and would "acknowledge and perfect that joint decision making that is already in place between the parties." Father's affidavit did not specifically allege he had satisfied the Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) requirement of a change in circumstances of the parties or their child, nor did he allege that the child's present environment endangered her in any way under section 518.18(d)(iv). Mother opposed Father's motion, submitting a responsive affidavit alleging that the parties were "unable to make major joint decisions" due in part to an inability to verbally communicate.

The district court denied Father's motion. In its order, citing exclusively to the endangerment criterion in section 518.18(d)(iv), the court stated that Father, as the party moving for custody modification, had the burden to show that (1) a change in circumstances had occurred; (2) modifying the current custody arrangement is necessary to serve the best interests of the child; (3) the present environment endangers the child's physical or emotional health; and (4) the harm likely to be caused by the change in environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change to the child. The court noted that to modify custody there must be a significant change in circumstances such as a custodial parent's impairment of a child's emotional health and development and not a continuation of ongoing problems that existed before the original order.

In its analysis of Father's motion, the district court considered assertions from both parties’ affidavits, and found (1) that there had been "no significant change in circumstance for the minor child or [Father] that would support a change in legal custody that is in the best interest of the child"; (2) that Father had "presented no evidence that the current status of sole legal custody to [Mother] endangers the minor child's physical or emotional health or emotional development"; and (3) given the parties’ history of communication challenges, Father had not shown that the benefits of a joint custody arrangement outweighed the harms. This analysis led the court to conclude that Father failed to set forth a prima facie case for custody modification based on endangerment. Therefore, the court denied Father's request for an evidentiary hearing.

Father appealed, arguing that the district court erred by applying the wrong standard to his custody modification motion. Specifically, Father argued that, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the district court should have considered his motion exclusively under the best-interests standard as section 518.18(d)(i) allows. Therefore, according to Father, the district court's application of the endangerment standard was incorrect.

The court of appeals affirmed. Woolsey v. Woolsey , No. A20-0749, 2020 WL 7689614, at *4 (Minn. App. Dec. 28, 2020). The court of appeals did not reach the issue of the correct legal standard—that is, whether the parties’ agreement to the best-interests standard under section 518.18(d)(i) or the endangerment standard of section 518.18(d)(iv) applied—because it determined a change in circumstances was a "prerequisite" to granting a motion to modify custody, "even if the proposed modification is to be based on the child's best interests" as stipulated. 2020 WL 7689614, at *2. The court of appeals concluded that Father's failure to make the threshold showing of changed circumstances was "fatal to [his] motion regardless of his allegations regarding the child's best interests." Id. at *3.

We granted review to determine whether the district court erred in applying the endangerment standard of section 518.18(d)(iv) to a custody modification motion when the parties had agreed, as permitted under section 518.18(d)(i), to application of the best-interests standard.

ANALYSIS

Determining the proper legal standard to be applied to a child-custody modification motion presents a question of law that we review de novo. Crowley v. Meyer , 897 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Minn. 2017). We review a district court's decision to deny a motion to modify custody without an evidentiary hearing under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Goldman v. Greenwood , 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008). "A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record." Bender v. Bernhard , 971 N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022) (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted).

Minnesota Statutes section 518.18(d) governs the district court's modification of an existing child custody order. That statute prescribes the reasons a court can modify a custody order and establishes the findings it must make to do so. It provides in relevant part:

[T]he court shall not modify a prior custody order ... unless it finds ... that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the parties and that the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child. In applying these standards the court

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