Daugherty v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't

495 F.Supp.3d 513

Tyrone DAUGHERTY, Plaintiff

v.LOUISVILLE-JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO GOVERNMENT, et al., Defendants

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-660-RGJ

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division.

Signed October 19, 2020

Filed October 20, 2020

Shaun A. Wimberly, Sr., Wimberly & Associates, PLLC, Louisville, KY, for Plaintiff.

Susan K. Rivera, Jefferson County Attorney, Louisville, KY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Rebecca Grady Jennings, District Judge

Plaintiff Tyrone Daughtery alleges violations of state and federal law against Defendants Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government ("Louisville Metro"), Steven Conrad, Chief of the Louisville Metro Police Department ("Conrad"), and Unknown Officers of the Louisville Metro Police Department ("Unknown Officers"). [DE 2 at 32]. Defendants move to dismiss the claims against Louisville Metro and Conrad. [DE 7]. Briefing is complete and the matter is ripe. [DE 14; DE 15]. For the reasons below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [DE 7] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART .

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, an African-American, was driving through a "predominant [sic] African-American community" in Louisville, Kentucky when he noticed a "suspicious looking car following him very closely." [DE 2 at 35]. After Plaintiff made a right-hand turn, Unknown Officers, who were following him in an "unmarked Louisville-Metro Police cruiser," activated the car's "government issued emergency lights, signaling to [Plaintiff] that a traffic stop was being initiated." Id. at 36. Plaintiff stopped his car "in response to the said Unknown Officer's show of authority." Id.

Unknown Officers approached his "driver side window and immediately informed him of two minor traffic violations" and then asked him "if there were any guns in his vehicle." Id. Plaintiff told the Unknown Officers that he "had a legal gun in the vehicle along with a permit to carry the legal gun." Id. Unknown Officers ordered Plaintiff to exit his car. Id. When Plaintiff asked why, Unknown Officers told him: "[B]ecause I am giving you a lawful order and the Supreme Court states that I do not have to give you an excuse." Id.

Plaintiff told Unknown Officers that he did not consent to a search of his car. Id. By this point in the traffic stop, additional units, including a K9 unit, had arrived at the scene. Id. at 37. Unknown Officers and the police dog searched Plaintiff and his car. Id. Unknown Officers "took possession of" Plaintiff's driver's license and "ran a criminal records search of [Plaintiff], which concluded to negative results." Id. Once they had completed their search and recovered no contraband, Plaintiff alleges that Unknown Officers "willfully issued a Commonwealth of Kentucky Uniform Citation upon [Plaintiff] in an attempt to justify the traffic stop and search" of him and his car and "cover-up the illegal actions." Id. Plaintiff alleges that he was not "stopped because of any justified suspicion that they he was involved in criminal activity; rather, he was stopped by members of the Defendant City's Police Department because [he] was an African-American." Id.

Plaintiff sued in this Court. [DE 1]. Plaintiff's overarching theory is that "Defendant City's Police officers, Defendant Unknown Officers, while on police duty, routinely position[ed] their police vehicles in predominant [sic] African-American communities and disproportionately stopped and search black drivers’ persons and vehicles ... because they are African-American."

[DE 2 at 40]. Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983, and state-law claims of battery and violations of Section 3 and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution. Id. at 33.

II. STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) instructs that a court must dismiss a complaint if the complaint "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To state a claim, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When considering a motion to dismiss, courts must presume all factual allegations in the complaint to be true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield , 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). "But the district court need not accept a bare assertion of legal conclusions." Tackett v. M & G Polymers , USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "A complaint will be dismissed ... if no law supports the claims made, if the facts alleged are insufficient to state a claim, or if the face of the complaint presents an insurmountable bar to relief." Southfield Educ. Ass'n v. Southfield Bd. of Educ. , 570 F. App'x 485, 487 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 561–64, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that: 1) Louisville Metro and Conrad are entitled to sovereign immunity; 2) Conrad is entitled to qualified immunity; and 3) Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead his claims against Louisville Metro and Conrad. [DE 7-1 at 84-88].

A. Immunity

1. Sovereign Immunity

a. State-law claims

Defendants argue that "Plaintiff raised state law claims of respondeat superior and civil rights violation pursuant to Sections 3 and 10 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Metro Government and Chief Conrad are entitled to sovereign immunity for all of these claims." [DE 7-1 at 84]. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument.

Under Kentucky law, political subdivisions of the Commonwealth, including county governments, are entitled to sovereign immunity. Yanero v. Davis , 65 S.W.3d 510, 525 (Ky. 2001). The General Assembly addressed the immunity of such governments in KRS 67C.101(2)(e), providing that consolidated local governments, like Louisville Metro, "shall be accorded the same sovereign immunity granted counties, their agencies, officers, and employees." KRS 67C.101(2)(e) ; see also Jewish Hosp. Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov't , 270 S.W.3d 904, 907 (Ky. App. 2008) ("[Louisville] Metro Government is entitled to sovereign immunity"); Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't v. Smolcic , 142 S.W.3d 128, 132 (Ky. 2004) (finding Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government immune from suit). Thus, absent an explicit statutory waiver, Louisville Metro is entitled to immunity. Jewish Hosp. Healthcare Servs., Inc. , 270 S.W.3d at 907. As there has been no explicit statutory waiver for these types of claims, Louisville Metro is entitled to sovereign immunity for Plaintiff's state-law claims. See Schwindel v. Meade Cty. , 113 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Ky. 2003) ("If damages could be recovered against a county on the basis of respondeat superior , the concept of sovereign immunity would be largely nullified because state and county governments perform their ministerial functions by and through their agents, servants, and employees"); Albin v. Louisville Metro Gov't , No. 3:19-CV-576-DJH, 2020 WL 1310495, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 19, 2020) (finding Louisville Metro entitled to sovereign immunity and dismissing state-law claims). Conrad is likewise entitled to sovereign immunity. When sued in their official capacity, officials are "cloaked with the same immunity as the government or agency he/she represents." Schwindel , 113 S.W.3d at 169 (Ky. 2003) (citing Yanero , 65 S.W.3d at 522 ). As a result, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's state-law claims against Louisville Metro and Conrad in his official capacity.

b. Punitive damages

Defendants argue that Louisville Metro is immune from punitive damages claims under both § 1983 and Kentucky law. [DE 7-1 at 94]. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument.

As to a municipality's immunity from punitive damages in a § 1983 claim, the answer is clear: "[A] municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. , 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981). Based on this binding precedent, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claim against Louisville Metro for punitive damages under § 1983.

But as to punitive damages under Kentucky law the answer is less clear because neither Kentucky courts nor the Sixth Circuit have conclusively resolved this issue. That said, several courts in this circuit have considered this issue and found that a municipality, like Louisville Metro, is immune from punitive damages in state-law claims. See D.H. v. Matti , No. 3:14-CV-732-CRS, 2015 WL 4530419, at *10 (W.D. Ky. July 27, 2015) ("In light of the statute, [Louisville Metro Housing Authority v.] Burns [198 S.W.3d 147 (Ky.App.2005)], City of Newport [v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981)], and Phelps [v. Louisville Water Co., 103 S.W.3d 46 (Ky.2003)], this Court finds that the Kentucky Supreme Court would not allow for punitive damages against a municipality ... Accordingly, the Court concludes that the plaintiff may not recover punitive damages the City of Brandenburg"); Johnson v. Kentucky-Cty. of Butler , No. 1:12CV-37-JHM, ...