Kloeppel v. Champaign Cnty. Bd.

2021 IL App (4th) 210091

186 N.E.3d 1094

Darlene KLOEPPEL, in Her Official Capacity as Champaign County Executive, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.The CHAMPAIGN COUNTY BOARD, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 4-21-0091

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

FILED November 12, 2021

Keri-Lyn J. Krafthefer and Steven D. Mahrt, of Ancel Glink, P.C., of Bloomington, for appellant.

James B. Harvey and Tammy S. Warden, of Tracy Johnson & Wilson, of Joliet, for appellee.

James W. Glasgow, State's Attorney, of Joliet (Adam Lipetz, Assistant State's Attorney, of counsel), for amicus curiae County of Will.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 This appeal involves an intracounty government dispute over who holds authority to appoint a person to fill a vacancy in an elected county office, including vacancies on the county board. On one side, plaintiff, Champaign County Executive Darlene Kloeppel (County Executive or Kloeppel), alleges section 2-5009(d) in the Counties Code ( 55 ILCS 5/2-5009(d) (West 2020)) gives her the appointment power and asks this court to affirm the trial court's order declaring the same and entering summary judgment for her. On the other side, defendant, the Champaign County Board (County Board), asserts section 25-11 of the Election Code ( 10 ILCS 5/25-11 (West 2020) ) gives the appointment power to the chair of the county board and asks us to reverse the trial court's order denying it summary judgment. Reading the plain language of each statute and giving effect to both, we conclude the Election Code governs appointments to vacancies in elected offices and gives that power to the county board chair. We therefore reverse the trial court's order entering summary judgment for Kloeppel and enter summary judgment for the County Board.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In the November 2016 general election, the Champaign County electorate voted to change the county government's structure from a township organization under division 2-1 of article 2 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/art. 2, div. 2-1 (West 2016)) to a county executive organization under division 2-5 of article 2, known as the County Executive Law (55 ILCS 5/art. 2, div. 2-5 (West 2016)). Two years later, the voters elected plaintiff, Darlene Kloeppel, Champaign County's first county executive. Since Kloeppel took office, certain elected county offices (namely, the county treasurer and seats on the County Board) became vacant before their elected term expired and, therefore, required persons be appointed to fill the vacancies. As had been done before the change in county government structure, those appointments were made by the County Board chair pursuant to section 25-11 of the Election Code ( 10 ILCS 5/25-11 (West 2018) ).

¶ 4 In June 2020, Kloeppel filed a complaint alleging the County Board chair "usurped [her] executive duties by appointing four (4) County Board Members and one (1) County Treasurer." Kloeppel argued the County Executive Law, particularly section 2-5009(d) ’s grant of power to "appoint *** persons to serve on the various boards and commissions to which appointments are provided by law to be made by the board" ( 55 ILCS 5/2-5009(d) (West 2020)) gave her, the county executive, "[t]he power to appoint persons to fill County Board vacancies." Though Kloeppel acknowledged section 25-11 of the Election Code outlined the procedure for filling vacancies in elected offices and seemingly settled the appointment duties on "the chair of the county board or board of county commissioners with the advice and consent of the county board or board of county commissioners" ( 10 ILCS 5/25-11 (West 2020) ), she argued the county board chair does not exist under the county executive form of government and, therefore, section 25-11 of the Election Code must be read in light of section 2-5009(d) of the County Executive Law to give the appointment power to the person presiding over the county board—the county executive. See 55 ILCS 5/2-5009(l ) (West 2020). Kloeppel ultimately asked the trial court to "declare as a matter of law *** [t]hat the County Executive is the proper appointing official, including the persons to serve on the various boards and commissions in Champaign County, including County Board vacancies."

¶ 5 The County Board's answer denied it usurped the appointment power from the County Executive and relied on a plain reading of section 25-11, which expressly provides an elected office "vacancy shall be filled within 60 days by appointment of the chair of the county board or board of county commissioners with the advice and consent of the county board or board of county commissioners." (Emphases added.) 10 ILCS 5/25-11 (West 2020).

¶ 6 The litigation culminated in dueling dispositive motions: the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings and defendant's motion for summary judgment. Following a telephonic hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement and promised the parties a written ruling.

¶ 7 The trial court's order first addressed the procedural posture, noting that, although the parties presented different motions, neither presented a factual dispute and both sought judgment as a matter of law. Consequently, the trial court treated the parties’ filings as cross-motions for summary judgment.

¶ 8 The trial court next identified "[t]he primary statute at issue in this case [a]s 55 ILCS 5/2-5009(d), which requires a county executive to ‘appoint, with the advice and consent of the board, persons to serve on the various boards and commissions to which appointments are provided by law to be made by the board.’ " The court then concluded: "The plain language of this statute indicates that a county executive is to make appointments to vacancies for unexpired terms on a county board." The trial court reasoned the County Board was included in "various boards and commissions" because it was not excepted from the phrase. It further reasoned that section 25-11 of the Election Code provided for appointments to the board when vacancies occurred, thereby making the County Board one of the " ‘various boards *** to which appointments are provided by law to be made by the board.’ "

¶ 9 The trial court then evaluated the County Executive Law as a whole and considered "how [it] interacts with the Election Code." The trial court identified two relevant provisions in the County Executive Law, namely the "explicit supersession of the election of a chairman of the board [in subsection 2-5015] and [the] requirement that a county executive preside over the board meetings." The court concluded, "It follows that the appointment powers previously possessed by the chairman of the board would necessarily flow to the county executive after adoption of that form of government." The trial court then concluded, "In short, when considering the County Executive Law as a whole and in context with the other statutory provisions, the ‘sensible construction’ is one that places the appointment power in the hands of the chief executive officer," quoting Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board , 226 Ill. 2d 485, 510, 315 Ill.Dec. 772, 877 N.E.2d 1101, 1116 (2007).

¶ 10 The trial court lastly addressed Kloeppel's request that it declare "[t]hat the office of County Board Chairman does not exist in a County Executive form of government such as Champaign County" and enjoin the County Board from giving a member the title of County Board chair. The trial court declined Kloeppel's request because the County Executive Law "does not prohibit use of that title."

¶ 11 Writing in broad terms, the trial court concluded the County Executive held the "appointment power," reasoning: "To say that Ms. Kloeppel is the County Executive, but she lacks appointment power would be to lend her the title but not the functions that the voters have given her." The trial court ultimately "declare[d] that the County Executive is the proper appointing official, including appoints [sic ] to be made pursuant to the Election Code." The trial court entered summary judgment for plaintiff and against defendant.

¶ 12 This appeal followed.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 Defendant challenges the trial court's order, arguing it erred in declaring the county executive holds the power to appoint persons to fill vacancies in elected county offices because the Election Code expressly states the county board chair must make those appointments. Specifically, defendant contends the trial court interpreted section 2-5009(d) "to create an inconsistency" with section 25-11 in the Election Code. Plaintiff counters by arguing the trial court reached the proper conclusion because, "when taken as a whole, the Illinois legislature granted the County Executive with appointing powers that were not limited to non-elected positions but included positions on the Champaign County Board itself." Kloeppel specifically argues section 2-5009(d) makes "the County Executive *** the proper appointing official to fill vacancies in elected county offices, including appointments to be made to the County Board."

¶ 15 Resolving this dispute requires statutory construction, which simply means "[t]he act or process of interpreting" or explaining the meaning of a statute. Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Since "[t]he interpretation of a statute is a matter of law, *** we review the trial court's decision de novo " ( Village of Chatham v. County of Sangamon , 351 Ill. App. 3d 889, 894, 286 Ill.Dec. 566, 814 N.E.2d 216, 222 (2004) ), meaning we owe no deference to the trial court's interpretation or decision. "It is well established that [our] primary objective *** when construing the meaning of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent." Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook , 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04, 247 Ill.Dec. 473, 732 N.E.2d 528, 535 (2000). We look first to the statute's language because it is "the most reliable indicator of the legislature's objectives in enacting a particular...