McDonald v. Symphony Bronzeville Park, LLC

2022 IL 126511

193 N.E.3d 1253

456 Ill.Dec. 845

Marquita MCDONALD, Appellee,

v.SYMPHONY BRONZEVILLE PARK, LLC, et al.

(Symphony Bronzeville Park, LLC, Appellant).

Docket No. 126511

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed February 3, 2022.

Richard P. McArdle, Alexandra S. Davidson, and Joseph A. Donado, of Seyfarth Shaw LLP, of Chicago, for appellant.

Ryan D. Andrews and J. Eli Wade-Scott, of Edelson PC, of Chicago, J. Aaron Lawson, of Edelson PC, of San Francisco, California, and David J. Fish and Mara A. Baltabols, of The Fish Law Firm, P.C., of Naperville, for appellee.

Gretchen Harris Sperry, Joshua G. Vincent, David M. Schultz, and John P. Ryan, of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, of Chicago, for amici curiae Affected Illinois Employers.

Melissa A. Siebert, Matthew C. Wolfe, and Yara K. Rashad, of Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, of Chicago, and Angelo I. Amador, of Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae Restaurant Law Center.

Kurt Niermann, of Porro Niermann Law Group LLC, of Aurora, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.

Vitas J. Mockaitis, of Costa & Ivone, and Michelle L. LaFayette, of Ganan & Shapiro, P.C., both of Chicago, for amicus curiae Workers’ Compensation Lawyers Association.

Matthew J. Singer, of Matt Singer Law, LLC, Gail S. Eisenberg, of Loftus & Eisenberg, Ltd., and Catherine Simmons-Gill, of Offices of Catherine Simmons-Gill LLC, all of Chicago, for amici curiae National Employment Lawyers Association, Illinois Chapter, et al.

JUSTICE OVERSTREET delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The instant action involves an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. July 1, 2017), wherein we consider the following certified question:

"Do[ ] the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act [(Compensation Act) ( 820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2016))] bar a claim for statutory damages under [the Biometric Information Privacy Act (Privacy Act) ( 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. (West 2016))] where an employer is alleged to have violated an employee's statutory privacy rights under [the Privacy Act]?"

The appellate court allowed defendant's Rule 308 appeal and answered the certified question in the negative. 2020 IL App (1st) 192398, 447 Ill.Dec. 561, 174 N.E.3d 578. This court allowed Bronzeville's petition for leave to appeal ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)), and for the following reasons, also answers the certified question in the negative.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On August 17, 2017, Marquita McDonald filed a putative class action against the defendant, Symphony Bronzeville Park, LLC (Bronzeville), alleging that Bronzeville's collection, use, and storage of McDonald's and the putative class's sensitive biometric data pursuant to a fingerprint timekeeping system violates the Privacy Act.¹ In April 2019, McDonald filed a first-amended complaint, wherein she, inter alia , added as defendants two related entities, Symcare Healthcare LLC and Symcare HMG LLC; withdrew a common-law negligence claim; and removed allegations that she suffered mental anguish as a result of the Privacy Act violations, stating that the allegations of mental anguish were "unnecessary to her recovery on her [Privacy Act] claim."

¶ 4 According to the amended complaint, Symcare Healthcare LLC owns a network of post-acute-care facilities, including Bronzeville's location, which provide patients with a variety of services, from rehabilitative to palliative care, typically after they have undergone major medical procedures. Pursuant to the allegations specific to her, McDonald alleged that she was employed by Bronzeville from December 2016 to February 2017 and that Bronzeville utilized a biometric information system, which required her to scan her fingerprint, as a means of authenticating employees and tracking their time. McDonald alleged that she was never provided with nor signed a release consenting to storage of her biometric information and had never been informed of the purposes or length of time for which her biometric information was being stored.

¶ 5 Accordingly, McDonald alleged that Bronzeville and the other defendants had violated—and continued to violate—various statutory requirements of the Privacy Act ( 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. (West 2016)). Specifically, McDonald and the putative class alleged that defendants negligently failed to obtain written releases from them before collecting, using, and storing their biometric identifiers and biometric information (id. § 15(b)(3)); negligently failed to inform them in writing that their biometric identifiers and biometric information were being collected and stored (id. § 15(b)(1)); negligently failed to inform them in writing of the specific purpose and length of time for which their biometric identifiers or biometric information was being collected, stored, and used (id. § 15(b)(2)); and negligently failed to publicly provide a retention schedule or guideline for permanently destroying the biometric identifiers and biometric information (id. § 15(a)).

¶ 6 McDonald and the putative class alleged that, by negligently collecting, storing, and using their biometric identifiers and biometric information, Bronzeville violated their rights to privacy in their biometric identifiers or biometric information as set forth in the Privacy Act. 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. (West 2016). McDonald and the putative class sought (1) injunctive and equitable relief to protect their interests by requiring Bronzeville to comply with the Privacy Act's requirements, (2) liquidated damages of $1000 per violation for each negligent violation of section 20(1) of the Privacy Act (id . § 20(1)), and (3) reasonable attorney fees and costs and other litigation expenses pursuant to section 20(3) of the Privacy Act (id. § 20(3)).

¶ 7 Bronzeville filed motions to dismiss McDonald's class action complaint pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619(a)(9) (West 2016). Bronzeville asserted, inter alia , that McDonald and the putative class alleged claims that were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Compensation Act ( 820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2016)). Bronzeville argued that the Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for accidental injuries transpiring in the workplace and that an employee has no common-law or statutory right to recover civil damages from an employer for injuries incurred in the course of her employment.

¶ 8 On June 17, 2019, the Cook County circuit court denied Bronzeville's motions to dismiss. The circuit court rejected Bronzeville's argument that the Compensation Act preempted any claims by an employee against an employer under the Privacy Act. The circuit court held that McDonald's injury involved the loss of the ability to maintain her privacy rights, which was neither a psychological nor physical injury and not compensable under the Compensation Act. The circuit court further held that the Privacy Act specifically defined "written release" in the employment context and, thus, the legislature intended for the Privacy Act to apply to violations by employers in the workplace. Accordingly, the circuit court allowed McDonald's claim to proceed in the circuit court. 740 ILCS 14/10 (West 2016) (" ‘Written release’ means informed written consent or, in the context of employment, a release executed by an employee as a condition of employment.").

¶ 9 On July 18, 2019, Bronzeville filed a motion for reconsideration of the circuit court's conclusion or, alternatively, a motion to certify questions for immediate appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (eff. July 1, 2017). Bronzeville argued, inter alia , that the Compensation Act and the Privacy Act can both reasonably be given effect in an employment context. Bronzeville explained that when an employee demonstrates that injunctive or declaratory relief is appropriate, then that employee may obtain redress under the Privacy Act, but when the employee seeks a statutory right to damages under the Privacy Act, that claim is preempted by the exclusive remedies afforded under the Compensation Act.

¶ 10 In a written order entered on October 29, 2019, the circuit court denied Bronzeville's motion to reconsider but certified the following question for interlocutory appeal: "Do[ ] the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act bar a claim for statutory damages under [the Privacy Act] where an employer is alleged to have violated an employee's statutory privacy rights under [the Privacy Act]?" The circuit court also stayed the proceedings before it, pending resolution of the certified question in the appellate court.

¶ 11 The appellate court granted Bronzeville's request for leave to appeal in December 2019. 2020 IL App (1st) 192398, ¶ 8, 447 Ill.Dec. 561, 174 N.E.3d 578. Citing this court's decision in Folta v. Ferro Engineering , 2015 IL 118070, 397 Ill.Dec. 781, 43 N.E.3d 108, the appellate court held that, to determine whether an employer's liability is governed exclusively by the provisions of the Compensation Act, the court must consider whether " ‘the injury is the type of work-related injury within the purview of the [Compensation Act].’ " 2020 IL App (1st) 192398, ¶ 21, 447 Ill.Dec. 561, 174 N.E.3d 578 (quoting Folta , 2015 IL 118070, ¶ 36, 397 Ill.Dec. 781, 43 N.E.3d 108 ).

¶ 12 Recognizing that an employee can escape the exclusivity provisions of the Compensation Act if she establishes that her injury is not "compensable" under the Compensation Act, the appellate court nevertheless noted the dearth of caselaw applying a compensability standard to the question of whether the Compensation Act preempts a claim under the Privacy Act. Id. ¶ 22. The appellate court agreed with the observation from the federal court's decision in Treadwell v. Power Solutions International, Inc. , 427 F. Supp. 3d 984 (N.D. Ill. 2019), that the Folta court made clear that the inquiry regarding whether an injury is compensable " ‘is broader than just whether an injury...