People v. Schoonover

2021 IL 124832

190 N.E.3d 802

454 Ill.Dec. 820

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,

v.Hayze L. SCHOONOVER, Appellee.

Docket No. 124832

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed December 16, 2021.

Rehearing denied January 24, 2022

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Gopi Kashyap, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Thomas A. Karalis, Deputy Defender, and Akshay Mathew, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee.

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 A jury found defendant, Hayze L. Schoonover, guilty of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. At trial, the Champaign County circuit court invoked section 115-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) ( 725 ILCS 5/115-11 (West 2014) ) to effectuate a temporary closure of the courtroom during the minor victim's testimony.

¶ 2 The appellate court majority reversed and remanded for a new trial after finding the trial court committed second-prong plain error for failing to inquire as to whether the spectators removed from the courtroom during the minor's testimony had a direct interest in the case.

¶ 3 We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2018). Finding no clear or obvious error under section 115-11 or the sixth amendment ( U.S. Const., amend. VI ), we reverse the appellate court and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 4 BACKGROUND

¶ 5 Defendant, Hayze L. Schoonover, was charged with four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault against his niece, M.L., a child under 13, in violation of section 11-1.40(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012 ( 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2014)). The State alleged defendant, who was over the age of 17, committed "act[s] of contact" with the victim, M.L., who was under the age of 13, for the purpose of defendant's sexual gratification, in that he touched M.L.’s vagina with his hand (count I), touched M.L.’s breasts with his hand (count II), placed his penis in M.L.’s mouth (count III), and placed his penis in M.L.’s hand (count IV).

¶ 6 Relevant here are the proceedings surrounding the temporary and partial closure of the courtroom during M.L.’s testimony at trial. The record reflects M.L. was the first to testify for the State. Prior to M.L.’s testimony, the trial court indicated its intention to have the courtroom cleared during M.L.’s testimony. The record reflects the following exchange:

"THE COURT: When [M.L.] testifies, I want the courtroom cleared except for family members.

MR. LARSON [(ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY)]: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. ALLEGRETTI [(DEFENSE ATTORNEY)]: I'm sorry, Judge. [Defendant's] family members are here. Is that—are you barring them?

THE COURT: Out."

¶ 7 Other matters relevant to the trial proceedings were then addressed before returning to the issue of closing the courtroom during M.L.’s testimony. The record reflects the following discussion:

"THE COURT: All right. Well pursuant to [section 115-11 of the Code ( 725 ILCS 5/115-11 (West 2014) )], where the alleged victim of the offense is a minor under eighteen years of age, the court may exclude from the proceedings while the victim is testifying all persons who, in the opinion of the court, do not have a direct interest in the case except the media. So I'm going to order that the courtroom be cleared, with the exception of the media, when [M.L.] testifies. I will note [defense counsel's] objection.^[1]

MR. LARSON: Your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LARSON: The victim's grandmother is here and would like to remain.

THE COURT: She would be someone who is allowed to remain. All right. With that—

MR. ALLEGRETTI: Judge, I'm sorry. Just one thing before we get started. I just would like to make a standing objection to all 115-10 evidence.^[2]

THE COURT: All right. The objection is overruled. Bring in the jurors."

¶ 8 After the parties’ opening statements and prior to M.L. taking the stand, the following discussion occurred outside the presence of the jury:

"THE COURT: All right. At this point pursuant to [section 115-11], I'm going to clear the courtroom. Mr. Larson, you said the grandmother is going to be present.

MR. LARSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Who else?

MR. LARSON: Your Honor, her father and stepfather we would also ask to be present.

THE COURT: Who is in the back of the courtroom? Who is the gentleman sitting there? And then the rest of the people on this side. All right. As soon as we get done with her testimony, I will bring the rest of the people in the courtroom."

¶ 9 After M.L. testified, the courtroom was reopened and remained open for the remainder of the trial. M.L. was subsequently recalled and testified a second time where she testified in open court.

¶ 10 The jury convicted defendant of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, including counts I, III, and IV. The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive imprisonment terms totaling 85 years.

¶ 11 In a posttrial motion for new trial, defendant alleged errors unrelated to the partial closure of the courtroom. The trial court denied the motion.

¶ 12 On appeal, defendant argued the partial closure violated section 115-11 of the Code ( 725 ILCS 5/115-11 (West 2014) ) and his right to a public trial under the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution ( U.S. Const., amend. VI ). 2019 IL App (4th) 160882, 441 Ill.Dec. 848, 158 N.E.3d 253. Specifically, defendant argued he was denied his constitutional right to a public trial when the trial court cleared the courtroom during M.L.’s testimony pursuant to section 115-11. Defendant also maintained the court violated statutory requirements when clearing the courtroom and improperly excluded persons with a direct interest in his trial.

¶ 13 In response, the State argued defendant's claims were "waived" when counsel failed to object to the closure of the courtroom. Further, the State argued the record was devoid of any indication that the spectators who were excluded were immediate family members or otherwise had a direct interest in the case.

¶ 14 In a thorough discussion, the majority of the appellate court found defendant's claims were not waived but forfeited.³ Although forfeited, the court reviewed the claims for plain error. The court found that noncompliance with the statute constituted second-prong plain error and denied defendant his right to a public trial. The court ultimately reasoned the trial court overstepped its authority under section 115-11 because it failed to make an express finding concerning the interests of those excluded. The court held:

"The [trial] court's failure to make any inquiry indicates that it did not make an informed decision as to whether the family members brought to its attention had a direct interest in the proceedings prior to excluding them. Such action amounted to a blanket exclusion of anyone other than members of M.L.’s family and the media and constituted a violation of statutory requirements."

2019 IL App (4th) 160882, ¶ 29, 441 Ill.Dec. 848, 158 N.E.3d 253.

¶ 15 The appellate court majority reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial. Justice DeArmond, in dissent, argued that, while the court should have conducted a greater inquiry into the identity and relationship of those present, defendant failed to sustain his burden or clearly express his objection. Id. ¶¶ 59-86 (DeArmond, J., dissenting).

¶ 16 This court allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2018).

¶ 17 ANALYSIS

¶ 18 At issue is whether the trial court's partial and temporary closure and exclusion of spectators from the courtroom during M.L.’s testimony, without making an express determination as to whether each spectator asked to leave during the closure had a direct interest in the case, violated section 115-11 of the Code and, in turn, defendant's constitutional right to a public trial pursuant to the sixth amendment.

¶ 19 Whether an individual's constitutional rights have been violated is subject to de novo review. People v. Hale , 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 15, 374 Ill.Dec. 912, 996 N.E.2d 607. This case also presents an issue of statutory construction subject to de novo review. People v. Hunter , 2013 IL 114100, ¶ 12, 369 Ill.Dec. 549, 986 N.E.2d 1185 ; People v. Zimmerman , 239 Ill. 2d 491, 497, 347 Ill.Dec. 648, 942 N.E.2d 1228 (2010).

¶ 20 Forfeiture

¶ 21 First, we consider whether the issue is subject to review. The State argues (1) defendant forfeited his claims when he failed to object at trial and in a posttrial motion and (2) the appellate court erred when it excused defendant's forfeiture as second-prong plain error. Defendant acknowledges he failed to preserve his claims for appellate review; however, he maintains he is excused under the plain error doctrine.

¶ 22 "To preserve a purported error for consideration by a reviewing court, a defendant must object to the error at trial and raise the error in a posttrial motion." People v. Sebby , 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48, 417 Ill.Dec. 756, 89 N.E.3d 675. Failure to preserve an error results in forfeiture. Id.

¶ 23 Finding no objection to the removal of spectators from the courtroom on the record nor finding the issue raised in a posttrial motion, as well as recognizing defendant's acknowledgment that he failed to preserve his claim, we conclude defendant forfeited his claim.

¶ 24 Plain Error

¶ 25 Finding forfeiture, we consider whether defendant's forfeiture may be excused. A defendant's forfeiture may be excused under the plain error doctrine. Id. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) provides "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court." As such, "remedial application of the plain error doctrine is...