Wild Horse Observers Ass'n, Inc. v. N.M. Livestock Bd.

519 P.3d 74

WILD HORSE OBSERVERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. NEW MEXICO LIVESTOCK BOARD, Defendant-Appellant,andShelley McAlister, Nathan Lippert, and Teeatta Lippert, Defendants by Intervention.

No. A-1-CA-37810

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Filing Date: July 22, 2022

Steven K. Sanders & Associates, LLC, Steven K. Sanders, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Olga Serafirmova, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant

Falen Law Offices, LLC, Brandon L. Jensen, Cheyenne, WY, for Amici Curiae New Mexico Cattle Growers’ Association and New Mexico Farm and Livestock Bureau

Reynolds Law Office, David G. Reynolds, Placitas, NM, for Amici Curiae Caroline McCoy, Clint Skeen, Michael S. Neas, Susan Blumenthal, Carolyn Kennedy, and Lynn Montgomery

HANISEE, Chief Judge.

{1} In this appeal, we again examine the protection afforded to New Mexico's free-roaming horses under NMSA 1978, Section 77-18-5 (2007). We first did so seven years ago, when we concluded in Wild Horse Observers Association, Inc. v. New Mexico Livestock Board , ( Wild Horse I ) that certain undomesticated, unowned, free-roaming horses could not be characterized as "livestock" or "estray" rather than as "wild horses." 2016-NMCA-001, ¶ 16, 363 P.3d 1222. In the case at hand, the New Mexico Livestock Board (the Board) appeals from a district court order granting declaratory and injunctive relief sought by Wild Horse Observers Association, Inc. (WHOA) under the New Mexico Declaratory Judgment Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 44-6-1 to -15 (1975), and the Livestock Code, NMSA 1978, §§ 77-2-1 to -18-6 (1869, as amended through 2015). As was the case in Wild Horse I , the Board wishes to classify certain horses—this time corralled by a private citizen onto private property—as estray livestock, rather than as wild horses. We agree with the district court that the Board may not do so; however, we reverse the district court's determination that when the Board unlawfully captures horses on private land, the testing requirements of Section 77-18-5(B) apply, potentially triggering the unjustified removal of wild horses from their natural habitat. See id. (providing that a wild horse "captured on public land shall have its conformation, history and deoxyribonucleic acid tested [DNA]"). We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and for additional consideration of attorney fees.

BACKGROUND

{2} In 2016, private land lessor Carolyn McCoy contacted the Board complaining about a herd of free-roaming horses near her property in Alto, an unincorporated community in Lincoln County, New Mexico. The Board informed McCoy that it was only permitted to take possession of horses that are corralled or captured by a private citizen. Afterward, McCoy corralled twelve horses—seven mares and five foals (the subject horses)—and contacted the Board again.¹ In August 2016, the Board took possession of the subject horses, transported them to Santa Fe, and informed Lincoln County residents that the horses would ultimately be returned to Lincoln County, which incorporates Alto, in the following weeks. Such was inconsistent, however, with that which the Board posted on its website, namely that the subject horses would be sold at auction.

{3} WHOA filed a complaint for declaratory relief and emergency injunctive relief on August 29, 2016, asserting that the Board exceeded its authority and unlawfully treated the subject horses as estray livestock. A month later, WHOA filed a petition for declaratory relief seeking an order declaring the subject horses to be wild horses, as well as a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing the Board from impounding or selling the subject horses. The district court granted WHOA's request for a TRO, thereby prohibiting the Board from "taking any action to sell, dispose, move away, separate or dissipate" the subject horses "during the pendency of this cause." The TRO expressly permitted the Board to "work[ ] with [WHOA], or any member of the public in Lincoln County who is willing to provide real estate, stables, pens, food and services for the care and preservation of [the subject] horses during the pendency of this cause of action." The district court denied the Board's request that WHOA be required to post a bond upon entry of the TRO.

{4} Subsequently, nine individual residents of Lincoln County—some of whom became intervening parties to the proceeding—executed certificates agreeing to provide shelter, food, and health care for the subject horses together at a designated location in Alto, during the pendency of this action. WHOA moved to extend the TRO in December 5, 2016, which the district court did. The TRO was modified in February 2017 to allow two of the subject horses to be adopted for medical reasons. One year later, the district court again modified the TRO allowing the intervening parties who were caring for the subject horses to be removed from any obligations agreed upon under the certificates they signed. The district court further ordered that WHOA and the Board share the expenses of caring for the subject horses until a trial on the merits, and required the parties to determine a new location for the subject horses to reside. Pursuant to that order, the subject horses were transferred to a fenced property within Lincoln County, near Carrizozo, New Mexico.

{5} The district court presided over a four-day bench trial in May 2018. Afterward, the court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law, determining that the Board's actions to take possession and sell the subject horses are contrary to the Board's statutory authority. The district court additionally concluded that the Board failed to comply with its statutory duties under Section 77-18-5(B), enjoined the Board from "further unlawful possession and selling" of the subject horses, and awarded WHOA costs and attorney fees. The Board appeals.

DISCUSSION

{6} On appeal, the Board asserts that because the subject horses were captured on private, rather than public land, the district court erred in concluding them to be "wild horses" under Section 77-18-5(A)(4) and in concluding that the Board must adhere to Section 77-18-5(B). The Board also contends that the district court made findings of fact that are unsupported by substantial evidence, issued a vague injunction, erred in awarding attorney fees, and erred in refusing to impose an injunction bond upon WHOA.²

I. The District Court Did Not Err in Concluding That the Subject Horses Are Wild Horses Under Section 77-18-5(A)(4), but Erred in Concluding That When the Board Wrongfully Took Possession of the Subject Horses on Private Land, the Board Should Have Conformed to its Duties Under Section 77-18-5(B)

{7} The primary issue on appeal relates to the Board's authority and responsibilities as to the subject horses after they were corralled on McCoy's private property. The Board argues that the district court erred by concluding that the subject horses are "wild horses," as that term is defined in Section 77-18-15(A)(4), because they were not "captured on public land," which is a phrase that appears in a different subsection of the statute, Section 77-18-15(B), and because the Legislature clearly intended to distinguish between public land and private land in the Livestock Code in general. WHOA answers that although the subject horses were captured by a private citizen on private land, the district court did not err in determining that the subject horses are wild horses and not estray, and therefore, may not be treated as estray, because Section 77-18-5 "was enacted to preserve and maintain New Mexico[’s] public ranges for wild horses, generally, and also to protect Spanish colonial horses, specifically."

{8} We review the district court's order and injunction for abuse of discretion. See Rapid Temps, Inc. v. Lamon , 2008-NMCA-122, ¶ 13, 144 N.M. 804, 192 P.3d 799 ("Generally, a complaint seeking injunctive relief is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. However, the trial court abuses [its] discretion when it applies an incorrect standard, incorrect substantive law, or its discretionary decision is premised on a misapprehension of the law." (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted)). However, we review the district court's application of Section 77-18-5 to the subject horses—whose habitat generally includes public land but who were corralled on private property—de novo. See Little v. Jacobs , 2014-NMCA-105, ¶ 7, 336 P.3d 398 ("Statutory interpretation is an issue of law that we review de novo." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). "When construing statutes our charge is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To discern that "appellate courts look first to the plain language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature indicates a different one was intended." Wild Horse I , 2016-NMCA-001, ¶ 11 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted). "[W]hen a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation." Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 2010-NMSC-009, ¶ 37, 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "The statute or statutes, whose construction is in question, are to be read in connection with other statutes concerning the same subject matter." State ex rel. Child., Youth & Fams. Dep't v. Djamila B. , 2014-NMCA-045, ¶ 10, 322 P.3d 444 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).

A. The Legal Framework Regarding New Mexico's Wild Horses

{9} Before turning to the district court's application of Section 77-18-5, we briefly set forth the relevant legal background. New Mexico's wild horses are governed by federal law and certain New Mexico statutes and administrative code provisions. In...